

## Mid-term review (MTR) of the AMIF – ISF National Programmes

### Developments in Union Policies

As part of the mid-term review of the AMIF and ISF national programmes (Art.15 of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014), Member States shall review the situation in the light of developments in Union policies. The process and the methodology are described in the Note AMIF-ISF/2017/05.

This document aims at presenting in a succinct manner the priority Union policy developments that should be taken into account by Member States when preparing the mid-term review of their national programmes.

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## Children in migration

<b>EU policy development</b>	Protection of children in migration
Reference	C(2017)211
Overview	On 12 April 2017 the Commission adopted a Communication on the protection of children in migration. The Communication takes stock of the protection gaps and challenges that emerged in the context of the migration crisis, and sets out urgent actions to be taken to enhance the protection of migrant children, with a focus on strengthening cross-border cooperation and improving coordination among all relevant stakeholders at EU, national, regional and local level.
Why	<p>The large number of children in migration arriving to the EU, poses numerous challenges to the host countries, and requires urgent and coordinated action for their protection. Children are especially vulnerable and they face specific risks and have special needs that can only be met with a targeted response.</p> <p>There are about five million child migrants in Europe, and almost one million children applied for asylum in the EU in the last three years. Member States confirmed that this is a priority adopting on 8 June 2017 Council conclusions on the protection of children in migration (ref. 10085/17 - <a href="http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10085-2017-INIT/en/pdf">http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10085-2017-INIT/en/pdf</a> ).</p>
How	Member States to prioritise children in migration under AMIF and ISF national programmes; by allocating with priority the means for programmes and projects aimed to enhance protection of migrant children (for ex. by expanding/improving reception conditions, by providing education, health care, training for recruitment of staff), as well as their integration. Member States should also ensure that all organisations and entities to be funded have internal child protection policies in place. It should be possible to quantify and monitor the amounts spent on this particular group as well as the degree of compliance of the actions and projects with the above mentioned aim (protection and integration of migrant children) when reporting. For that purpose, the use of indicators, where available, (for example, in shelters for children) is especially relevant.

## Children: sexual abuse, exploitation and pornography

EU policy development	Combatting the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography
Reference	Directive 2011/93/EU on combatting the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography
Overview	Directive 2011/93/EU is a comprehensive legal instrument that sets out minimum standards to be applied throughout the European Union. It follows a holistic approach to tackle these crimes effectively, incorporating provisions covering investigation and prosecution of offences, assistance and protection of victims, and prevention.
Why	<p>Sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children are particularly serious forms of crime with a cross border dimension, as listed in Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. They produce long-term physical, psychological and social harm to vulnerable victims, children, who have the need and the right to special protection and care, as explicitly stated in Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.</p> <p>Online child sexual abuse is a nefarious crime with long-term consequences for its victims. Harm is caused not only when abuse is actually recorded or photographed, but also every time the images and videos are posted, circulated and viewed. For the victims, the realisation that the images and videos in which they are abused are 'out there' and that they could even encounter someone who has seen the material is a major source of trauma and additional suffering.</p>
How	<p>The Commission is currently monitoring the implementation of the Directive. The assessment shows that there is still considerable scope for the Directive to reach its full potential.</p> <p>This includes facilitating, through funding and coordination, the development and exchange of best practices in this area. For the Member States, a focus should be placed on</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) building competence in law enforcement</li> <li>(2) better protection of victims</li> <li>(3) treatment for perpetrators</li> </ol>

## Cybercrime

EU policy development	Combatting cybercrime
Reference	Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems
Overview	The Directive covers the main offences related to cyber attacks and introduces new offences such as the use or making available of tools to commit cyber attacks. It approximates Member State's definitions of cybercrime offences, setting minimum maximum penalties and providing a framework for the exchange of information on these crimes between Member States, and for the collection of statistical information.
Why	<p>Cybercrimes have a strong cross-border dimension and necessitate cross-border cooperation. Cyber-attacks are, in fact, booming. A 2016 study by PwC revealed that the number of security incidents across all industries rose by 38% in 2015, which is the biggest increase in the past 12 years, while at least 80% of European companies have experienced at least one cybersecurity incident. In Q3 2016 alone, 18 million new malware samples were captured, that is an average of 200,000 per day.</p> <p>In some Member States, it has been estimated that more than half of all crimes are cybercrimes. Some of these attacks have aimed at high-profile targets, including power grids, important webmail services, central banks, telecom companies and electoral commissions.</p>
How	<p>The Commission is currently monitoring the implementation of the Directive. The assessment shows that there is still considerable scope for the Directive to reach its full potential.</p> <p>This includes facilitating, through funding and coordination, the development and exchange of best practices in this area. For the Member States, a focus should be placed on</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) building competence in law enforcement</li> <li>(2) better protection of victims</li> </ol>

## Entry/Exit System

EU policy development	<i>Development and Implementation of the ENTRY/EXIT system</i>
Reference	<i>COM 2016/196 – currently in trilogue with European Parliament and Council of the EU</i>
Overview	<i>'Entry/Exit System (EES)' will register entry and exit data and refusals of entry data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union for a short stay (less than 90 days in any 180-day period).</i>
Why	<i>The implementation of EES is scheduled in 2020. This will require all Members States to adapt their processes and border control equipment and applications. The EES will require that MS are able to enrol biometrics of visa-exempt travellers at the external borders, check and update the EES from all border posts. The impact of EES on border control processes may lead to the implementation of kiosks and automated border control lanes (both at entry and at exit).</i>
How	<i>National programmes should reflect on development effort for the integration (or development) of national border control applications with the (central) EES, ensuring the high availability of national applications and networks communicating with EES ,the enhancement of border control equipment and the implementation of means for facilitations border crossings according to re-designed border control processes. EES will impact all borders (air, land and sea) but a special effort will probably be required for land borders and for controls on trains.  As EES can also be accessed by Law Enforcement Authorities but under strict conditions, the national programmes should also reflect on the processes and means to be implemented to perform requests for Law enforcement access purposes according to the process described in the Regulation.</i>

## European Travel Info and Authorisation System (ETIAS)

EU policy development	Development and Implementation of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)
Reference	COM(2016) 731 final – currently under discussion with European Parliament and Council of the EU
Overview	The proposed regulation establishes a 'European Travel Information and Authorisation System' (ETIAS) for third country nationals exempt from the requirement to be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders ('the visa requirement') enabling to determine whether their presence in the territory of the Member States does not pose an irregular migration, security or public health risk. The authorisation granted to a traveller will be valid for a period of time. ETIAS is expected to be operational by 2021.
Why	ETIAS is expected to become operational by 2021 and will assume EES exists. To be useful, Member States need to have set up national units which analyse and take position (grant travel authorisation or not) on authorisation requests which have generated hits in European and international databases and/or in the watch list or were singled out by means of screening rules. The ETIAS status will also become a condition for entry in the Schengen area and for being allowed boarding on a plane or vessel with a Schengen area destination.
How	National programmes should reflect on the effort required to create the National units in terms of staff and equipment needs, the processes required for conducting risk assessments at national level and communicating quickly and efficiently with both national units of other Member States and the central unit (located in EBCGA), the processes for communicating securely with applicants and following up on requests for correction and redress. ETIAS brings also an additional border crossing requirement as from all border posts the ETIAS status will need to be consulted. ETIAS status will also be consulted by carriers and MS authorities in air and sea borders who should change their processes and applications for a situation where passenger data are simply sent in advance to them without further response being required, to a situation where the information sent should also trigger a response informing the carrier on the ETIAS status.

## Integrated Border Management (IBM)

EU policy development	Development of the IBM strategic framework
Reference	Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation 2016/1624 (EBCG Regulation)
Overview	The EBCG Regulation provides that the EBCG Agency shall establish a technical and operational strategy for European integrated border management. It shall promote and support the implementation of European integrated border management in all Member States, which aims at managing the crossing of the external borders efficiently, addressing migratory challenges and potential future threats, contributing to addressing serious crime with a cross border dimension, ensuring high level of internal security, respecting fundamental rights and safeguarding the free movement of persons within the Union. Consequently, the Regulation requires that Member States set national IBM strategies in line with the technical and operational strategy issued by the EBCG Agency and 11 strategic components described in Article 4 of the EBCG Regulation to ensure the implementation of the integrated border management model at national level.
Why	The unified development of the national IBM strategy in line with the technical and operational strategy and 11 strategic components shall be a priority for each Member State to support effective operationalization of the EBCG Regulation and to guarantee full interoperability and sustainable development of the European IBM concept at the national level. By providing funding for the implementation of IBM strategy for the Member States, a uniform and high level of border control could be ensured at EU borders. The implementation of the strategy must be supported by multiannual action plans in the Member State that shall include concrete actions to be financed multi-annual funding programmes (especially the designated financial instruments such as ISF-Borders).
How	Where necessary, a Member State shall revise its national programme in accordance with Article 14 (9) of Regulation 514/2014 to implement the European integrated border management in accordance with Article 3 and 4 of the EBCG Regulation. National programme should be based on national IBM strategy established in line with the EBCG Regulation.

## Integration of third-country nationals

EU policy development	Integration of third-country nationals
Reference	Article 79.4 TFUE
Overview	Adoption of the action plan on integration of third-country nationals on 7 June 2016. Increase number of integration needs due to the arrival of asylum seekers in the EU (+2.8 million in 2014/2015/2016) out of which a substantial number will remain in the EU.
Why	Integration has become a priority for many EU Member States. Investing in integration is necessary to turn migration into an opportunity. Needs in some Member States are huge and all possibilities to support MS efforts have to be used, including with AMIF. This is all the more needed as the use of AMIF for integration purposes has been very limited, particularly for some MS.
How	<p>Support the integration of third-country nationals, in particular in the five priority areas identified in the Commission's Action Plan on Integration adopted in June 2016:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Pre-arrival/ pre-departure measures</li> <li>2. Education</li> <li>3. Labour market and preparatory measures</li> <li>4. Access to basic services</li> <li>5. Active participation &amp; social inclusion</li> </ol> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Provide support to local authorities in the development, implementation and evaluation of integration initiatives at the local level</li> <li>– Provide support to non-governmental organisations in the development, implementation and evaluation of integration initiatives</li> <li>– Support integration projects that foresee an active participation and involvement of migrant communities and diasporas</li> <li>– Support integration projects that aim at fostering connections among different actors involved in integration, promoting an integrated approach to integration measures</li> </ul>



## Interoperability of Information Systems

EU policy development	Improvement of the interoperability of information systems
Reference	COM(2017) 261 final - Seventh progress report towards an effective and genuine Security Union - COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL,
Overview	This is a follow up to the April 2016 Commission Communication on stronger and smarter information systems for borders and security and the work of the High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability that the Commission set up following that Communication.
Why	<p>The April 2016 Communication on stronger and smarter information systems for borders and security identified a number of structural shortcomings related to information systems:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• sub-optimal functionalities in some of the existing information systems;</li> <li>• information gaps in the EU's architecture of data management;</li> <li>• a complex landscape of differently governed information systems; and</li> <li>• a fragmented architecture of data management for borders and security where information is stored separately in unconnected systems, leading to blind spots.</li> </ul> <p>In order to address those shortcomings the Commission proposed actions leading to Interoperability of information systems for security, border and migration management. With a goal to ensure that by 2020 border guards, law enforcement officers including customs officials, immigration officials and judicial authorities have the necessary information at their disposal</p>
How	<p>The Commission set out a new approach to the management of data for borders and security where all centralised EU information systems for security, border and migration management are interoperable in full respect of fundamental rights so that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the systems can be searched simultaneously using a European search portal, in full compliance with purpose limitations and access rights, to make better use of existing information systems, possibly with more streamlined rules for law enforcement access;</li> <li>• the systems use one shared biometric matching service to enable searches across different information systems holding biometric data, possibly with hit/no-hit flags indicating the connection with related biometric data found in another system;</li> <li>• the systems share a common identity repository with alphanumeric identity data, to detect if a person is registered under multiple identities in different databases.</li> </ul> <p>The national programmes should address the need for the Member States to carry out the necessary IT developments (both software and hardware) and the related training.</p>

## Migrant smuggling

EU policy development	EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015 - 2020)
Reference	COM(2015) 285 final
Overview	<p>The 2015 EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling lays out several specific actions to implement in order to more effectively prevent and fight against migrant smuggling to the EU and within the EU.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. In relation to the first pillar of the action plan on an enhanced police and judicial response to migrant smuggling, Member States are encouraged in their national programmes (ISF-P) to enhance capacities for investigations and prosecutions of migrant smuggling networks. In this context aligning national priorities to the European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) priority on Facilitated Illegal Immigration is strongly encouraged, for instance cooperation on the prevention of documentary fraud, improving financial investigations linked to migrant smuggling, the use of social media by smugglers, and other forms of abuse of legal entry and residence procedures.</li> <li>2. Member States are encouraged through their national programmes (ISF-B) to enhance their presence through Immigration Liaison Officers posted to third countries of origin and transit of irregular migration in order to encourage and ensure more effective information gathering and exchange. To this end, synergies in information sharing should be in line with the ILO network Regulation and the recently posted European Migration Liaison Officers in priority third countries<sup>1</sup>, as well as Liaison Officers posted by EU Agencies Frontex and Europol.</li> <li>3. On the preventive side of migrant smuggling, Member States are encouraged to make use of their national programmes (AMIF) also to engage in information and awareness raising campaigns on the risk of irregular migration in countries of origin and transit relevant for particular Member States. Counter-narratives to those provided by migrant smugglers should be developed, including through social media and the involvement of diaspora communities in the EU.</li> </ol>
Why	<p>Migrant smuggling is a cross-cutting phenomenon which lies at the juncture between migration and security. It is cross-border crime by definition and a priority to address at EU level. Therefore, Member States who have competence in investigating and prosecuting migrant smuggling criminal networks, should utilise national programmes as far as possible to tackling this ruthless criminal activity, which often puts the lives of migrants at risk, while generating vast amounts of illicit profit.</p>
How	<p>Member States are encouraged to take into account the priorities of the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling and where possible allocate further resources through national programmes to these priority areas. Since migrant smuggling is tackled through a comprehensive approach from prevention to investigation and prosecution, all HOME funding instruments<sup>1</sup> can be utilised to implement various elements. The AMIF for preventive actions, the ISF-Borders for actions in third countries and at the borders, and the ISF-Police fund for national reactive and investigative capacity building.</p>

<sup>1</sup> Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey

## Passenger Name Record

EU policy development	Implementation of the Directive 2016/681 on the use of PNR data (the PNR Directive)
Reference	Directive 2016/681 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime
Overview	Directive 2016/681 provides for the obligation of Member States to adopt the necessary measures to ensure that air carriers that operate flights to and from the Member States transfer the PNR data of their passengers to the Passenger Information Units (PIUs) to be established in each Member States. The PIUs will process the PNR data in order to fight terrorism and serious crime.
Why	The processing of PNR data collected from air carriers has been increasingly recognised as a useful tool in the fight against terrorism and a number of serious criminal offences. The PNR Directive provides for the creation of a PNR system in EU Member States (with the exception of Denmark, which is not taking part in the application of the Directive) and establishes a harmonised set of data protection safeguards. The PNR Directive also provides for an effective system of exchange of PNR data and the result of their processing between EU Member States.
How	Given the importance of the proper and timely implementation of the PNR Directive (the transposition deadline is 25 May 2018), the Commission is actively supporting Member States' efforts to establish PNR system compliant with the Directive's requirements. Financial support is also foreseen to assist Member States in coping with the technical requirements established by the Directive, notably as concerns the acquisition of the hardware and software needed for the collection, storage and processing of PNR data for law enforcement purposes.

## Radicalisation

EU policy development	Radicalisation
Reference	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revised EU Strategy for combating Radicalisation and Recruitment (9956/14)<sup>2</sup></li> <li>• Commission Communication on preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: strengthening the EU's response" (COM(2013) 941 final)<sup>3</sup></li> <li>• Commission Communication on supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism (COM(2016) 379 final)<sup>4</sup></li> <li>• Relevant Council Conclusions<sup>5</sup></li> </ul>
Overview	<p>In the above mentioned policy documents, the Commission has called for an in-depth knowledge and a multi-faceted response to an increasingly complex and evolving phenomenon, by focusing on several areas, such as <b>supporting research (also on the root causes of radicalisation), evidence building, monitoring and networks (mainly of practitioners), the online dimension, prisons and rehabilitation, common values and inclusive societies, education and youth</b>. Furthermore, the Commission had encouraged Member States to established prevent strategies and networks of practitioners. Recent reports from Europol and IntCen have furthermore highlighted and confirmed a number of challenges and threats including in particular threats e.g. from attempts to <b>recruit asylum seekers or refugees, returning FTFs and children, new pathways of radicalisation, rise of right wing extremism and risks of polarisation</b>.</p>
Why	<p>Recent terrorist attacks in Europe once again underlined the urgent need to tackle radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism. In spite of not being a new phenomenon, its most recent manifestations, its scale, as well as the use of new communication tools present new challenges. It is important to fund projects at Member States level in this field since measures countering radicalisation fall primarily within the competence of the Member States. It is important that initiatives at EU level are supported or complemented at national level to ensure sustainability and complementarity of efforts.</p>
How	<p>The national programmes should support projects on radicalisation by focusing mainly on the <b>priority areas highlighted above</b>. This would include for instance support at national level to ensure sustainability of efforts to empower civil society in their efforts to develop counter and alternative narratives, efforts which will be supported at EU level under the Civil Society Empowerment Programme. The approach should ideally put an emphasis on the <b>local</b> dimension and projects should <b>involve civil society</b> as part of an multi-agency approach. The funded projects should furthermore encourage the creation of <b>networks of practitioners</b> and in the selection projects it would be appropriate to give priority to <b>follow-up projects</b> of successful outcomes and to <b>transferrable and scalable projects</b>. The projects should have, from the setup phase, an <b>in-built evaluation element</b>.</p>

<sup>2</sup> <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9956-2014-INIT/en/pdf>

<sup>3</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52013DC0941>

<sup>4</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016DC0379>

<sup>5</sup> Such as Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and of the Member States meeting within the Council on enhancing the criminal justice response to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism of 20 November 2015 (14419/15), Council conclusions on the role of the youth sector in an integrated and cross-sectoral approach to preventing and combating violent radicalisation of young people of 30 May 2016 (9640/16), Council Conclusions on Developing media literacy and critical thinking through education and training of 30 May 2016 (9641/16) , Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism of 21 November 2016 (14276/16).

## Return

EU policy development	1. A more effective return policy in the European Union – A renewed Action Plan
Reference	Directive 2008/115/EC, and Communication COM(2017)200 final.
Overview	<p>The following points – included in the abovementioned Commission Communications on return – remain of particular importance and interest and thus should be considered policy priorities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identification and implementation of good practice on disincentives for irregular stay by third-country nationals;</li> <li>• Exchange of best practice between Member States on improving procedures to identify and apprehend third-country nationals staying illegally;</li> <li>• Better coordination of asylum and return procedures, and encouraging practical cooperation between competent authorities (please note that such actions can also be placed under Specific Objective 1 Asylum);</li> <li>• Improved cooperation and coordination with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in the field of return to the benefit of the EU and Member States through, or in conjunction with, the activities of existing and new Specific Actions;</li> <li>• Ensuring adequate detention capacity (both adequate number and adequate quality of places in specialised detention facilities);</li> <li>• Ensuring availability of effective alternatives to detention and practical implementation of such measures, including for Unaccompanied Minors (UAMs) and other vulnerable groups;</li> <li>• Enhancing coordination and cooperation with third countries on return through, or in conjunction with, the activities of existing and new Specific Actions;</li> <li>• Support to the reintegration of returnees, including in particular UAMs and other vulnerable groups, with the view of their sustainable return to countries of origin through, or in conjunction with, the activities of existing and new Specific Actions;</li> <li>• Greater coherence of reintegration assistance and general practices to incentivise return through, or in conjunction with, the activities of existing and new Specific Actions;</li> <li>• Ensuring effective return of UAMs / families with children / other vulnerable groups (e.g. returnees with medical needs) that are fully in line with relevant human rights norms; through, or in conjunction with, the activities of existing and new Specific Actions;</li> <li>• Instruments for improving the practical cooperation and coordination between the national authorities responsible for return, detention, judiciary, medical and social services, guardianship authorities, to establish a multidisciplinary response to accelerate the management of return cases.</li> </ul>
Why	On 2 March 2017 the Commission presented the Communication "A more effective return policy in the European Union – A renewed Action Plan". The Communication, referring to the Commission Communication on EU Action Plan on return (COM(2015)453 final), underlined that it is important to continue the actions already announced in 2015, but also to maximise the use of EU financial or operational instruments in order to increase the effective number of returns throughout the EU, to better exchange information, and to improve cooperation and coordination among Member States and EU competent bodies.
How	Should Member States wish to prioritise one or more of the examples of actions listed above, they are invited to insert the relevant text in the corresponding National Objective. They are particularly encouraged to consider development and/or implementation of the above mentioned actions in conjunction with or through the existing Specific Actions (EURINT / ERIN / EURLO) and the new Specific Actions that are to be developed in the framework of the current pledging exercise [ <i>the assessment is ongoing – results should be known by summer</i> ].

## Resettlement

EU policy development	Implementation of resettlement schemes
Reference	AMIF Art 17 and Art 19 (1)(a); Resettlement Conclusions of 20 July 2015 (11130/15); EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, Resettlement and Relocation Reports; Proposal for a Regulation on a Union Resettlement Framework COM(2016) 468 final
Overview	While some Member States have been engaged in resettlement programmes for years, over the past two years the overall scale of resettlement in the EU has increased as well as the number of resettling Member States. Specific EU actions have been agreed in order to develop safe and legal pathways to protection as an alternative to irregular movements and ensure a stronger Union approach to resettlement, namely through the Conclusions of 20 July 2015, the resettlement mechanism established under the EU-Turkey Statement, and the proposal for a Union Resettlement Framework.
Why	Due to increased co-operation and co-ordination at EU level progress has been achieved, but there are still significant challenges which both the experienced resettlement States as well as newcomers to resettlement are facing. A number of Member States are still not investing enough in building capacity to develop, maintain, or increase their resettlement efforts. Increase in the quality of resettlement programmes can improve the experience and outcomes for both the beneficiaries of resettlement as well as the authorities and contribute to further developing and scaling up of safe and legal pathways to offer protection and better manage migration.
How	Apart from receiving lump sums per resettled person as set out in AMIF Article 17, Member States should make better use of their national programmes to also improve the quality and sustainability of national and European resettlement schemes. Member States should make use AMIF national programmes to build capacity for resettlement, provide training for its staff, conduct selection missions in third countries, organise pre-departure cultural orientation programmes, set up practical exchanges with other resettling States, improve process for the identification and registration of people whom they intend to resettle, and other actions aimed at development and establishment of resettlement programmes.

## Schengen Evaluations

EU policy development	Results of Schengen Evaluations
Reference	Regulation 1053/2013 and Article 12 of Regulation 515/2014
Overview	Following a Schengen evaluation report, the Member State concerned shall examine, together with the Commission and the EBCG Agency how to address the findings, including any deficiencies, and implement the recommendations within the framework of its national programme.
Why	The financing of corrective actions, including capacity building projects to address the deficiencies identified in the national border management shall be a priority in order to address the identified shortcomings.
How	Where necessary, a Member State shall revise its national programme in accordance with Article 14 (9) of Regulation 514/2014 to take into account those findings and recommendations, including capacity building projects to address the deficiencies identified in the national border management (such as: improve the national strategic planning system and the quality control mechanism as integral part of the national IBM, improve the level of harmonisation of the national legislation and practices with the EU Acquis, develop the national risk analysis system, develop the national training system for border guards, improve inter-agency coordination). In dialogue with the Commission and the EBCG Agency the Member State concerned shall reallocate resources under its programme and/or introduce or amend actions aiming to remedy the weaknesses in accordance with the findings and recommendations of the Schengen evaluation report.

## Schengen Information System - AFIS

EU policy development	Implementation of SIS automated fingerprint identification system (SIS AFIS)
Reference	<p>Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II);</p> <p>Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II);</p> <p>COM(2016) 93 final;</p> <p>COM(2016) 883 final;</p> <p>COM(2016) 882 final;</p>
Overview	<p>The next major change to the Schengen Information System will be the roll-out of an automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS). A study carried out by the JRC formed the basis of the Commission report to the European Parliament and the Council on the availability and readiness to use fingerprints (FP) in SIS for search. SIS already contains biometrics in the form of FP binary data attached to person alerts. However, no biometric matching capabilities are implemented at central system level. To strengthen the system and to enhance the possible identification of criminals, an AFIS at central system level will be implemented to offer these functionalities. As from February 2018 the AFIS functionality will be available at central system level. The roll-out to the Member States level will be done in two phases. Six Member States (AT, DE, CH, LV, PT and NL) participate in the first phase of the project (roll-out as from February 2018). During the second phase the functionality will be rolled out to all Member States.</p>
Why	<p>On numerous occasions, including in the Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security<sup>6</sup>, the Commission has emphasised the importance of implementing a central fingerprint matching service in order to reliably identify people entering the Schengen area and keep our borders and people safe. At least 28 percent of the wanted persons in SIS are travelling under a false identity. The latest Europol Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment<sup>7</sup> notes that the use of fraudulent documents in the EU has significantly increased and this represents a significant threat to the EU. The Commission has on multiple occasions strongly encouraged member states to join Phase 1 of the project. Phase 1 is going to go-live in February 2018. Changes foreseen in the new SIS proposals make the implementation of fingerprint search functionality in SIS mandatory.</p>
How	<p>The national programmes should address the need for the Member States to carry out the necessary IT developments (both software and hardware) to integrate with the full AFIS functionality, ensuring the high availability of the national interfaces and networks communicating with the SIS II AFIS. Member states have to ensure that their national programmes reflect on the necessity to extend their national systems to fully exploit the new biometric search capabilities. Moreover, fingerprint images must be usable for matching, therefore, of high quality. Some Member States are using inked prints which are of doubtful quality. Having live-scan equipment is important for the purposes of achieving high quality and the national programmes can reflect on this.</p>

<sup>6</sup> COM(2016) 205 final

<sup>7</sup> European Police Office, SOCTA 2017



## Schengen Information System - ANPR

EU policy development	Connection of national automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) systems to the Schengen Information System (SIS)
Reference	Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II); Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II);
Overview	The use of cameras (automatic number plate recognition) – ANPR, is an effective instrument to help tackle cross-border crime. Making the best possible use of this instrument, within the bounds of the law, will require greater efforts to exchange information. On a number of occasions, the Commission encouraged the EU Member States and Associated countries to connect their ANPR solutions to SIS in order to maximise their effectiveness.
Why	Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) systems are highly efficient in fighting vehicle theft and trace travelling criminal gangs. Cameras installed on the highways and in towns capture the number plate images of vehicles which are then compared against national databases of stolen vehicles and alerts on vehicles in the Schengen Information System. In case of a hit, police patrols can stop the vehicle. ANPR systems include fixed and mobile terminals. Member States should make the necessary investments to set up such terminals for law enforcement purposes and to connect them to the relevant national criminal databases as well as to the Schengen Information System. There are a number of advantages of having this connection, notably, the large amount of data related to lost or stolen vehicles and number plates in SIS.
How	National programmes should reflect on the effort required to establish online connections between the national ANPR systems and SIS. Furthermore, national programmes should take into account the prerequisite hardware and software to transmit the data. The necessary training programmes should also be envisaged so that end-users are aware of how potential hits on SIS alerts are to be managed.

## Schengen Information System - Upgrade

EU policy development	Upgrade of Schengen Information System (SIS) and implementation of new functionalities
Reference	COM(2016) 882 final COM(2016) 883 final COM(2016) 881 final
Overview	The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the most successful tool for the effective cooperation of immigration, police, customs and judicial authorities in the EU and the Schengen associated countries. It enables competent authorities to enter and consult data on wanted persons, persons who may not have the right to enter or stay in the EU, missing persons and objects that may have been stolen, misappropriated or lost.
Why	In 2016, the Commission carried out a comprehensive evaluation of SIS which showed that the system has been a genuine operational success. Nevertheless, the efficiency and effectiveness of SIS should be further strengthened. To this end, on 21 December 2016 the Commission adopted three proposals to update the legislation underpinning SIS and address the issues that the overall evaluation highlighted. The targeted amendments fill the potential security gaps identified by the evaluation and strengthen the system as a whole. The entry into operations of the updated functionalities of SIS is foreseen for 2020.
How	Member States have to upgrade their national systems in order to implement the new functionalities and comply with the requirements set out in the three legal proposals; their national programmes should address this. The Member States have to ensure that SIS remains functional and accessible to staff on the ground. There are also new provisions for facial images, photographs and palm prints to be used to search the system and identify people. Hence, the national programmes should address the implementation of the new biometric technologies. The proposals also make provisions for new alert categories, for example, for unknown wanted persons wanted in connection with a crime and for irregular migrants who have no right to stay in the Schengen area and who need to return to their home countries. Changes to existing alert categories are also foreseen, e.g. in relation to counter-terrorism and missing persons and the national programmes should also address the changes to the various code tables.  The proposals also grant access to SIS to the immigration authorities of the Member States. The national programmes should reflect on the processes and means (software, hardware) required to enable the national immigration services to use the system.

## Soft target protection

EU policy development	Soft target protection (incl. against CBRN threat)
Reference	<p>Council conclusions on the protection of soft targets from terrorist activities (25/10/2012)<sup>8</sup></p> <p>Communication on a new EU approach to the detection and mitigation of CBRN-E risks COM(2014) 247 final<sup>9</sup></p> <p>The European Agenda on Security COM(2015) 185 final<sup>10</sup></p> <p>Communication on delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union COM(2016) 230 final<sup>11</sup></p>
Overview	<p>Since the 2012 Burgas terrorist attack, the Commission together with Member States have been working on soft target protection. One of the tangible results is the Airpol – the airport police network – manual on protection of the landside of airports. The Commission encourages <b>sharing best practices</b> and development of materials helping all stakeholders to better prevent attacks on soft targets.</p> <p>Practical work has to be done however at the national and local level. In case of soft targets – more than in any other area of counter-terrorism policy – <b>security is a responsibility of all citizens and authorities</b> at all levels.</p>
Why	<p>Attacks in Europe (incl. Paris, Brussels, Nice, Berlin, and Manchester) and abroad (incl. Boston, Orlando) have shown the current <b>preference for attacks to "soft targets"</b> which are more vulnerable and difficult to protect: shopping malls, concert halls, public events etc.</p>
How	<p>The following action can be implemented at a national level with a view to enhance the soft target protection and enhance awareness of the threat:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "security by design" – projects aiming at arranging public space either already at the design stage or during subsequent renovation works with a view to achieve better <b>physical protection</b> and develop adequate <b>security processes</b>.</li> <li>- <b>trainings</b> for law enforcement and security forces on how to secure soft targets (incl. against CBRN threat) and how to respond to the attack on soft target</li> <li>- <b>awareness raising campaigns</b> for citizens on how to behave before, during and after the attack on soft target</li> </ul>

<sup>8</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/133215.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/133215.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/explosives/docs/20140505\\_detection\\_and\\_mitigation\\_of\\_cbrn-e\\_risks\\_at\\_eu\\_level\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/explosives/docs/20140505_detection_and_mitigation_of_cbrn-e_risks_at_eu_level_en.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu\\_agenda\\_on\\_security\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/legislative-documents/docs/20160420/communication\\_eas\\_progress\\_since\\_april\\_2015\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/legislative-documents/docs/20160420/communication_eas_progress_since_april_2015_en.pdf)

## Systematic checks against databases

EU policy development	Support for implementing systematic checks against databases
Reference	Regulation 2017/458 and Article 15 of Regulation 2016/399
Overview	<p>As of 7 April 2017, Member States are obliged to check systematically third-country nationals as well as persons enjoying the right of free movement under Union law against all relevant databases at the external borders. In accordance with Article 15 of Regulation 2016/399, Member States should deploy appropriate staff and resources in sufficient numbers to carry out systematic checks in order to prevent such checks from causing disproportionate waiting times and hindering the flow of traffic at external borders. This obligation is reflected also in Recital 8 of Regulation 2017/458.</p> <p>The Member States may decide to temporarily derogate from the principle of systematic checks subject to specific conditions and procedure to be followed.</p> <p>In view of the obligations resulting from Article 15 of Regulation 2016/39, such derogations cannot be open ended, meaning that despite possible derogations Member States should put efforts to develop the capacity to comply with the principle of systematic checks.</p>
Why	The financing of staff and equipment shall be a priority to address the need of systematic checks against relevant databases at the external borders.
How	Where necessary, a Member State shall revise its national programme in accordance with Article 14 (9) of Regulation 514/2014 to improve border checks by purchasing equipment and financing staff needed to perform systematic checks at the external borders.

## Vulnerability assessments

EU policy development	Results of Vulnerability Assessments
Reference	Article 13 of Regulation 2016/1624 (EBCG Regulation)
Overview	The EBCG Regulation provides that the EBCG Agency shall establish a common vulnerability assessment methodology. This shall include objective criteria against which the EBCG Agency shall carry out a vulnerability assessment, including an assessment of available technical equipment, systems, capabilities, resources, infrastructure, adequately skilled and trained staff of Member States necessary for border control.
Why	The aim of the vulnerability assessment is to assess the capacity and readiness of Member States to face upcoming challenges, including present and future threats and challenges at the external borders; to identify especially for Member States facing specific and disproportionate challenges, possible immediate consequences at the external borders and subsequent consequences on the functioning of the Schengen area; and to assess their capacity to contribute to the rapid reaction pool. Where necessary the executive director of the EBCG Agency, shall make a recommendation setting out the necessary measures to be taken by the Member State concerned. The Member State concerned is invited to take the necessary measures.
How	On the basis of the results of the vulnerability assessment, a Member State shall revise its national programme in accordance with Article 14 (9) of Regulation 514/2014 to take into account the EBCG Agency's baseline assessments and recommendations. The measures taken by the Member State concerned should be aimed at eliminating the vulnerabilities identified in the assessment in order for the Member States to increase their readiness to face upcoming challenges by improving their capabilities, technical equipment, systems, resources and contingency plans. The results of the vulnerability assessment will be transmitted on a regular basis to the Commission, who can use the results to define the funding priorities for Member States.